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Organizational control and environmental influences on organizational 
behavior are central themes in organization studies, yet little effort has 
been made to bring them together. In this paper we seek to contribute to 
filling this gap by investigating and conceptualizing environmental 
influences on organizational control. The paper examines patterns of 
organizational control and their environmental couplings through three 
parallel case studies of public universities in three European countries. We 
provide a systematic characterization of the space of configurations of 
control in professional knowledge-intensive organizations along the two 
axes of centralization of power and formalization of social relationships. We 
show that environmental characteristics do matter for the contestation and 
selection of control models. Finally, we unpack and conceptualize the 
synergetic influence of three environmental characteristics (institutional 
pressures, resource environment, and external social relationships) as 
providing sources of legitimacy and power for specific control regimes. 
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Abstract 
Organizational control and environmental influences on organizational behavior are central 
themes in organization studies, yet little effort has been made to bring them together. In this 
paper we seek to contribute to filling this gap by investigating and conceptualizing 
environmental influences on organizational control. The paper examines patterns of 
organizational control and their environmental couplings through three parallel case studies of 
public universities in three European countries. We provide a systematic characterization of 
the space of configurations of control in professional knowledge-intensive organizations along 
the two axes of centralization of power and formalization of social relationships. We show that 
environmental characteristics do matter for the contestation and selection of control models. 
Finally, we unpack and conceptualize the synergetic influence of three environmental 
characteristics (institutional pressures, resource environment, and external social 
relationships) as providing sources of legitimacy and power for specific control regimes. 
Key words. Organizational control, professional organizations, institutional pressure, external 
relationships, resource dependency 
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Introduction1 
Since Max Weber (1922), organizational control – i.e. the means through which the leadership 
steers the behavior of organizational members in order to achieve coordination and alignment 
with organizational goals (Ouchi 1979) – has been a central issue for organizational studies 
(Clegg 2012). Historically, the scholarly debate was characterized by a divide between a 
tradition considering the hierarchical-bureaucratic model as a functional solution to the 
problem of coordination in modern organizations (Ouchi 1980) and a critical tradition focusing 
on dynamics of power and control of external resources (Crozier et al. 1980; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). 
The study of professional knowledge-intensive organizations, highlighted features that cast 
doubt on the functionality of the hierarchical-bureaucratic model, such as goal and task 
uncertainty, professional autonomy, disconnected structures from tasks, and the related 
challenge of control under conditions of ambiguity (Pfeffer 1982; Scott 1987). Public 
universities have become recognized as examples demonstrating the inappropriateness of the 
hierarchical-bureaucratic model (Cohen et al. 1972; Mintzberg 1979), and as such they have 
traditionally been considered as loosely coupled organizations (Weick 1976), where 
organizational units are mutually unresponsive and evade hierarchical control due to weak 
leadership capacities. 
                                                          
1
 Authors are listed alphabetically. The authors would like to thank Christine Musselin for her 
contribution to an earlier version of the paper that was presented at the EGOS conference in 2011, and 
members of the research group Knowledge, Politics and Organization at the Department of 
Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen for their comments to a draft of this 
paper. The authors would also like to thank the editors of Organization Studies Frank den Hond and John 
Sillince, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for their comments and suggestions. 
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More recent work attempted to bridge these traditions by investigating how organizational 
control can be achieved while leaving room for autonomy of professionals, by proposing 
models like ‘soft bureaucracy’ (Courpasson 2000) or ‘bureaucracy-lite’ (Hales 2002). These 
studies demonstrated that hierarchy and rule setting are pervasive characteristics of modern 
organizations (Diefenbach and Sillince 2011), but also highlighted how different combinations 
of control instruments can be used to address the tension between central control and 
autonomy. 
This literature highlights the possibility of different patterns of control within organizations 
characterized by similar technology. As for universities, recent empirical evidence indeed 
points to differences in the extent to which hierarchy and rule setting have been introduced 
(Sahlin 2012; Paradeise and Thoenig 2013; Seeber et al. 2014). 
Despite the fact that organization theory recognized the deep influence of the environment on 
organizational behavior (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; DiMaggio and Powell 1983), the literature 
on organizational control tended to adopt an internalistic perspective focusing on 
characteristics of the technology and on the dynamics of power within organizations as 
sources of variation in control. 
This paper seeks to contribute to filling this gap by combining a perspective on organizational 
control with a perspective on environmental influences on organizations in order to 
understand how variations in control are associated with characteristics of the institutional 
and resource environment. 
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We specifically draw on neo-institutional theory and its conceptualization of organizational 
behavior being driven by compliance with field-level models (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). We 
integrate more recent research investigating how responses to institutional pressures are 
moderated by the structure of the resource environment (Zajack and Westphal 2004; 
Greenwood and Hinings 1996) and by social relationships of organizational members with 
external audiences (Delmas and Toffel 2009). 
We specifically investigate two questions through three parallel case studies of public 
universities in three European countries. First, we aim to advance our understanding of the 
possible configurations of control in professional knowledge-intensive organizations and their 
variations. We focus on two dimensions of control: 1) the balance between central control and 
the participation of professionals and 2) the importance of formal means of control, like 
hierarchy and rule systems, vs. informal means like social relationships and normative 
pressures. 
Second, we investigate how the synergetic influence of three environmental characteristics 
accounts for the observed variations: 1) institutional pressures towards the introduction of 
hierarchy and rule setting as instruments of control 2) the structure of the resource 
environment and the extent to which critical resources are controlled by the organizational 
leadership or by professionals and 3) the presence of social ties between key audiences and 
the leadership, which might increase leadership power and control over resources. 
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European universities represent a convenient setting to address these issues. They are public 
organizations, subject to regulatory interventions and, in the European context, display a high 
level of resource dependency on the State. Beginning in the 1990s, these universities have 
been pressured to introduce a hierarchical-bureaucratic coordination (Brunsson and Sahlin-
Andersson 2000), yet there are wide differences between national policy environments in both 
their extent and coerciveness (Ferlie et al. 2008; Bleiklie et al. 2011). Finally, universities are 
traditionally open organizations, characterized by a dense web of social ties to the policy layer, 
to stakeholders and to academic disciplines, which justifies the expectation that the 
leadership’s external social relationships influence patterns of intra-organizational control. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we deepen our understanding of variations 
in control within professional knowledge-intensive organizations by conceptualizing their 
space of configurations along two axes, namely the level of the centralization of power and the 
extent of social relationship formalization. Second, we advance towards a theorization of the 
coupling between environmental characteristics and intra-organizational control, by showing 
how characteristics of a specific control regime within this space are accounted for by the 
interplay between three processes, namely compliance with institutional pressures, control of 
external resources, and the social relationships of organizational actors. We subsume this 
coupling of intra-organizational control on the environment under the label of penetrated 
hierarchies. 
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Theoretical framework 
Control in professional organizations 
The functionalist and managerial tradition justifies the need for central control by the presence 
of interdependencies between activities and the risk that employees try to achieve their own 
personal goals (Ouchi 1980). It assumes that organizations address this issue by introducing 
formal hierarchy and rule systems tailored to the characteristics of their activities (Diefenbach 
and Sillince 2011). While this perspective initially applied mostly to private organizations, 
during the 1980s public policies began promoting the view that public organizations should 
also adhere to this model (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000). 
The critical tradition considered that organizations are characterized by the uncertainty of 
their tasks and environment. Accordingly, power accrues with the actors who are able to 
control uncertainties (Crozier et al. 1980) and critical external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). In this perspective, control is achieved through informal and micro-level arrangements, 
through social relationships and the sharing of information among employees, while hierarchy 
and formal structure are a means to accrue power and privilege for the organizational elite 
(Hardy and Clegg 2006). Some scholars even argued that the end of the bureaucratic model 
had come, and that decentralized models characterized by distributed assignments and flat 
hierarchies might become the post-modern form of organizations (Powell 1990).  
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Studies of knowledge-intensive organizations, like financial companies, consultancies, and 
healthcare organizations provided a more nuanced perspective, pointing to variations in the 
combination and enactment of control instruments (Clegg 2012). Control is achieved through 
flexible means, the number of hierarchical layers is reduced (‘bureaucracy-lite’: Hales 2002), 
indirect mechanisms are preferred to the overt use of hierarchical power (‘soft bureaucracy’: 
Courpasson 2000) and bureaucracy allows for legitimate resistance (‘polyarchic bureaucracy’; 
Courpasson and Clegg 2012). Organizations shape formal control instruments in a softer way: 
formal hierarchy is combined with informal control through social relationships and social 
authority (Diefenbach and Sillince 2011), while a balance is sought between vertical structure 
and horizontal peer coordination (Lundholm et al. 2012). Finally, bureaucracy is interpreted in 
an enabling approach, where rule systems are co-designed with the workers (Adler and Borys 
1996). 
This discussion suggests that organizations do not necessarily have to choose between two 
alternative models of control, i.e. the hierarchical-bureaucratic and the loosely coupled one. 
Rather, control in knowledge-intensive professional organizations is a delicate act of balancing 
central coordination and the participation of professionals, which can be realized through 
different combinations of formal and informal instruments of control. How variations in 
patterns of control are associated with characteristics of the environment has however, hardly 
been investigated by this literature. 
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Control in universities and its variations 
Universities are a prime example of organizations, which defied scholarly attempts to identify 
a clear-cut model of control, associated with their technology and with the academic 
profession. 
Some scholars considered them as loosely coupled (Cohen et al. 1972; Weick 1976) and 
political organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974), where collegial peer-to-peer decisions 
prevail over top-down hierarchy, and autonomy of professionals is defended against 
managerial control (Townley 1997). Others provided a more nuanced account in which 
professional autonomy and collegiality are not incompatible with central control (Musselin 
2007) and bureaucratic management (Blau 1973, Mintzberg 1979), provided control is 
achieved through softer means than overt use of hierarchical power (Lutz 1982; Padgett 1980). 
Empirically, a broad variety of patterns can be identified. American universities introduced 
central leadership and management as early as the 1960s (Ramirez and Christensen 2013), 
while European universities were characterized by the coexistence of state bureaucratic 
control over the administration and professional control over academic tasks (Clark 1983). 
Since the 1990s, many European countries introduced a wave of reforms aimed at improving 
the efficiency of public-sector organizations under the label of New Public Management 
(NPM), promoting concepts like organizational autonomy, strategic leadership and 
management, competition, and accountability (Ferlie et al. 2008). NPM policies were designed 
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to free universities from direct state control and transform them into organizations 
characterized by hierarchy and rule setting (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000). Policies 
were implemented through regulatory reforms, the introduction of market arrangements in 
funding (Teixeira et al. 2004), and various kinds of evaluation systems (Whitley and Gläser 
2007). Yet, the pace and extent of reforms strongly differed between countries (Paradeise et 
al. 2009; Bleiklie et al. 2011). 
There is some evidence that, under these pressures, European universities are transforming 
towards managed organizations with a stronger central leadership (Amaral et al. 2003), 
introducing hierarchy and formal rule systems (de Boer et al. 2007), but this process has been 
rather gradual. Variations in this respect are associated with the strength of NPM pressures in 
individual countries (Seeber et al. 2014) and with the characteristics and history of individual 
universities (Sahlin 2012, Paradeise and Thoenig 2013). 
Environmental characteristics and control 
Since the 1970s, neo-institutionalist literature endorsed the view that organizational behavior 
is not driven by interests or technical requirements, but by conformity with legitimate 
institutional models (Meyer and Rowan 1997; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This literature 
suggests a first process of coupling between the environment and organizational control, i.e. 
compliance with models of control present in the institutional environment. We specifically 
highlight that organizations are subject to pressures from a global institutional template, 
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stipulating the hierarchical-bureaucratic organization as the legitimate model of control 
(Meyer et al. 1997). 
Neo-institutionalist research supports the insight that coercive pressures from the State are 
particularly effective in enforcing compliance (Greenwood et al. 2008). The state influences 
organizational behavior through direct regulation, which constrains how control within the 
organization is achieved; further, in the European context, the largest share of university 
budgets are composed by direct allocation from the State, and therefore, non-compliance is 
likely to be associated with financial penalties. 
However, the introduction of institutional templates within organizations is rarely 
uncontested. Many organizations, including universities, have a largely political nature, i.e. 
decisions are the outcome of power struggles between different (groups of) actors. By 
combining institutional theory and political institutionalism (Greenwood and Hinings 1996), it 
can be argued that institutional pressure influences the legitimacy of control models, but these 
will be instrumentally mobilized by actors depending on their beliefs and interests (Fligstein 
1987). Specifically, institutional pressure towards central hierarchical-bureaucratic control will 
be mobilized by the university leadership, but will be opposed by professionals defending their 
social norms and autonomy (Townley 1997). 
Yet, resource dependency theory showed that the power of organizational actors is contingent 
on their control of critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974). This identifies a second 
process through which the environment influences control within organizations, i.e. through 
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changes in the resource environment influencing the relative power of the leadership vs. 
professionals (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). 
Traditionally, it was considered that decentralized control of resources, based on the ability of 
subunits to attract students and external funds, as well as on the reputation of individual 
academics, explained the limited power of the university leadership (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1974). Yet, especially in the European context, the situation is more nuanced. For example, 
concerning finances, in most cases the leadership negotiates the level of the core budget with 
the State, whereas third-party funds are acquired and managed directly by professionals. The 
balance between these two modes of allocation displays significant variations between 
countries depending on national policies. Further, policy reforms inspired by NPM not only 
foster hierarchical-bureaucratic coordination but also influence the structure of the resource 
environment and, depending on their instrumentation, might empower or disempower the 
leadership. For instance, the shift from a negotiated core budget to performance-based 
funding, calculated from the number of students, publications, and third-party funds, de facto 
reduces leadership discretion and power. 
Similar considerations apply to national evaluation systems introduced by NPM reforms that 
can be described by contrasting two models (Whitley and Gläser 2007). First, “intrusive” 
systems produce information about the strengths and weaknesses of individual universities, 
which are translated into normative and coercive pressures from the State for organizational 
adaptation. Such systems reduce leadership control over the organization – even more so 
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when influential academics are co-opted into evaluation committees. Second, “competitive” 
systems provide information generating competition between universities, while leaving 
discretion to the university leadership regarding which measures to adopt. Accordingly, the 
university leadership can make use of evaluations to control and steer academics. 
Control over resources does not depend solely on the market structure. Economic sociology 
and social network analysis extensively demonstrated the importance in this respect of social 
relationships (Granovetter 1973). Through them, individuals within the organization are set in 
a brokering position (Burt 1992), holding privileged access to critical information and reducing 
the level of uncertainty regarding resources. They might also get the opportunity to forge 
strategic alliances (Kogut 2012) and to influence decisions relevant to their own organization. 
Social relationships provide a third process conveying environmental pressures upon 
organizations, which is particularly relevant for our context of study. Universities are 
characterized by a dense web of social ties where academics are co-opted to serve on 
decision-making bodies and advisory committees, while political decisions are negotiated 
between civil servants and the university leadership. Depending on which university actors are 
involved in these relationships, they might strengthen leadership control over external 
resources or, on the contrary, provide influential academics with more autonomy and 
bargaining power within the university. 
While there has been extensive research on how these processes represent couplings between 
the environment and organizational behavior, research in this area displays two distinct gaps: 
Page 13 of 55
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/orgstudies
Organization Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
14 
 
first, most research tried to demonstrate the impact of single processes, while synergetic 
influences have been more rarely addressed (see, however, Greenwood and Hinings 1996). 
Second, to our knowledge, the influence of environmental characteristics on control in 
professional knowledge-intensive organizations has not been systematically investigated. 
Research design, methods and sources 
We develop our investigation through three parallel case studies of universities in three 
countries. They are named South, Central, and Northwest in order to avoid direct 
identification. 
This study is based on self-ethnography (Alvesson 2003) or complete participation (Adler and 
Adler 1987). For more than one decade, its authors have been active members of the 
organizational hierarchy of the universities analyzed. 
Following the literature, we consider this method to be a reasonable choice in terms of its 
ability to provide suitable empirical material for our specific research questions, when 
compared to the effort needed for wider data collection (Alvesson 2003; Brannick and Coghlan 
2007). First, being a member of the considered organization(s) allows the researchers to build 
on in-depth direct knowledge of how the focal organizations operate in real-life situations and 
provides access to different types of information, acquired in connection with their positions. 
While this is also the case for participant observation (ethnography), being members of the 
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studied organization allows the authors to provide a richer set of observations, including 
aspects that are likely to remain hidden to external observers. 
Secondly, self-ethnography brings advantages in terms of the resources needed for data 
collection, as well as in terms of timing: the focus of our investigation on variations across 
cases requires the use of comparative case studies, which are difficult to implement in 
ethnographic studies f r practical reasons, and due to their high costs (Ramirez and 
Christensen 2013). Further, the authors’ membership in the observed organization covers a 
longer time span than an ethnographic study, which is an obvious advantage when 
reconstructing organizational processes. 
Finally, the somewhat relatively exploratory nature of our research questions would make 
more structured methods, like surveys, problematic, whereas open interviews would run the 
risk of compliance and convenience biases in responses – as they mostly provide information 
on beliefs and perceptions, rather than on actual patterns of control. 
Self-ethnography raises methodological concerns related to the need to keep a sufficient 
distance from the object of study, avoiding blind spots, and the ability to move from 
knowledge of the specific to knowledge of theoretical interest (Brannick and Coghlan 2007). 
To address these concerns, we implemented a number of practices suggested by the literature. 
These are: a) writing the organizational accounts in constant confrontation with our theoretical 
understanding and rewriting them repeatedly in order to achieve reflectivity and distance from 
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the author experience; b) defining a set of points of observation, linking theory and accounts, 
and focusing the latter on dimensions of theoretical interest; c) contrasting the cases through 
systematic confrontation between the authors to create distance and promote reflectivity. The 
presentation of the cases through a combination of comparative tables and accounts of how 
control is achieved reflects this effort of balancing cross-case comparison with reports on the 
author’s experience. 
We triangulated this information with documentary sources, including previous research on 
the universities under study, official documents and reports, and documents to which we had 
access thanks to our position. This included official documents, like the university laws and 
statutes, organograms, annual reports and strategic documents, as well as internal documents 
like the results of evaluations, minutes of meetings, lists of appointments and information on 
individuals’ careers. 
Similarly, information on the policy environment was derived from previous research done on 
national higher education policy, document analyses, surveys and policy interviews, as well as 
comparative studies on higher education governance (Paradeise et al. 2009) and funding 
(CHEPS 2010). 
This paper focuses on observing variations across cases, referring to the situation in the most 
recent years (around the year 2011). We do not aim to systematically reconstruct temporal 
changes, but we selectively mobilize information on change when this helps to understand the 
coupling between the policy environment and organizational control. 
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Points of observation 
We investigate organizational control according to the two dimensions of central control vs. 
participation, respectively the use of formal vs. informal control instruments. 
Our assessment of formal hierarchy is based on (see de Boer et al. 2007): a) the extent to 
which power is centralized in the hands of a few individuals, excluding (representative) 
decision-making bodies; b) the extent to which leaders are clearly identified, responsibilities 
are allocated to them, and organization members are accountable to them and; c) the extent 
to which leaders enjoy decision-making discretion, have established managerial teams, have 
created new middle management positions, and separate managerial careers have emerged. 
To assess the use of rule systems, we look at the extent to which the university has established 
organizational goals and formulated objectives for organizational subunits with instruments to 
measure results. 
Further, we investigate to what extent central control is exercised through informal means, 
like putting institutional pressures on academics and stating goals and visions, and to what 
extent central control has been softened through (formal or informal) participation, including 
consulting academics before decisions are made, the use of horizontal peer coordination, and 
the co-construction of rules with academics. 
Concerning the institutional environment, we focus on the degree of pressures towards the 
hierarchical-bureaucratic model within national policy systems. We look at: a) the general 
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characteristics of the national policy regime, b) the strength of NPM rationales in higher 
education, c) the timing of the reforms, and d) the degree of coerciveness, i.e. to what extent 
NPM was enforced through direct regulation. 
Concerning the resource environment, we focus on: a) the extent to which allocation of the 
university core budget is negotiated or formula-based, b) the importance and characteristics of 
third-party funds, and c) the characteristics and coerciveness of national evaluation systems. 
When analyzing social relationships, we focus on their role in funding and evaluation. More 
specifically, we analyze: a) the extent to which the leadership and other organizational 
members enjoy privileged relationships with external audiences, particularly, with the State, b) 
their ability to influence decisions about core university funding, c) their degree of control over 
third-party funds, and finally, d) their influence on external evaluation processes and their 
implementation within the university. 
Results 
Three universities and their policy environment 
As shown in Table 1, all three universities are research-oriented, displaying a publication 
impact above the world average and a large number of PhD students. Central and South are 
rather small and young, have experienced rapid growth and pursue a niche strategy 
specializing in certain fields. Northwest is a larger and older comprehensive university. 
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Table 1 about here 
In all three countries, some degree of autonomy and negotiated settlements among the State 
and major social interests has shaped the universities’ policy environment. Central is located in 
a country traditionally characterized by a legalistic tradition and by negotiation between 
political authorities and major interest groups, while the policy system in the country of South 
is characterized by decentralization, a search for consensus amongst social groups, where self-
regulation and the autonomy of stakeholders is more important than top-down steering by the 
State. The country of Northwest is characterized by a tradition of consultation and negotiation 
among political authorities and economic interests, as well as strong democratic traditions. 
However, the balance between state steering, negotiated settlements and university 
autonomy, as well as the influence of NPM, is quite varied (Paradeise et al. 2009). While 
Central’s country introduced NPM with a strong focus on rationalization, steering at distance 
and strengthening hierarchical-bureaucratic control, the country of South has retained a 
governance model largely based on academic self-regulation and network governance, with 
limited diffusion of NPM narratives and instruments (Bleiklie et al. 2011). The country of 
Northwest was traditionally considered a slow-mover in public-sector reforms, but change 
accelerated after 2003 with the introduction of a national accreditation and evaluation agency 
and a more competitive funding system. 
Differences also characterize the structure of the resource environment. South and Northwest 
are faced with mixed funding systems, including a substantial component of historical 
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allocation negotiated between the university leadership and the State. Most funding to Central 
is based on standardized and indicator-based formulas. Northwest is embedded in a state civil 
service system where the rules of the game are set nationally through legislation, regulations, 
and funding mechanisms that are negotiated in meetings between the ministry and 
universities. Central is similarly embedded in a civil service culture in which national evaluation 
schemes structure the rule system, but the system is less intrusive and the university is left 
with larger autonomy on how to run the internal organization and evaluation. South is 
embedded in an informal setting with a light national evaluation system providing a high 
degree of organizational autonomy. 
Table 2 about here 
Control configurations compared 
With respect to the balance between central control and participation, and between formal 
and informal mechanisms, our case studies demonstrate patterns of commonalities and 
variations (table 3). 
Table 3 about here 
A) Hierarchy and central control. In all cases, the university leadership is attempting to gain a 
stronger position within the organization. Yet, there are deep differences regarding the level of 
centralization and the function of the hierarchy. We compare our three cases along three 
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dimensions: formalization of decision-making structure, centralization of decision-making, and 
engagement of actors across organizational levels. 
Formalization of central control. Both Central and Northwest have strengthened and 
formalized the decision-making hierarchy, which is directly mobilized as an instrument of 
control. By contrast South displays an informal pattern in which the role of the hierarchy is to 
legitimize the personal power of the university leadership, which is mostly exercised through 
informal processes. 
Centralization of decision-making. At Central and Northwest, decision-making structures have 
been transformed from representative to managerial: decision processes that once were 
meant to aggregate preferences from the bottom up now represent leadership authority. At 
Central this development started earlier and has gone further in developing a clear cut 
managerial structure, where academic managers and leaders are appointed in a top-down 
approach, thus disempowering academic bodies. Northwest on the other hand has retained 
essential elements of the traditional bottom up deliberative model, such as the coexistence of 
two leadership models where the rector is elected and chairs the board, while deans and 
department heads are either elected or appointed depending on the faculty. South displays a 
clear hierarchy where most strategic and budgetary decisions are concentrated in the hands of 
the leadership, while faculties and institutes are responsible for education and research. 
However, in all three cases the overt use of command and control is applied only in 
exceptional cases. 
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Engagement across organizational levels. At Central and Northwest, bodies at the faculty and 
department level are increasingly charged with developing and implementing decisions in 
accordance with organizational strategies. Central has gone further in introducing managerial 
roles and centralized decision-making processes, while representative elected bodies at the 
faculty and department levels still play a role in decision-making at Northwest. In comparison, 
the organizational structure of South is characterized by a sharp contrast between a strong 
central leadership nominated by the university council, where managerial roles are 
concentrated and participatory bodies at the faculty level populated by academics. 
B) Formal rules are important in all three cases, but we observe sharp differences concerning 
levels of formalization; i.e. who sets the rules and how they are applied. 
Rule Setting. At Central, rule setting is systematically used by the leadership to steer 
professionals and to justify decisions. Targets, performance indicators, and regular evaluation 
of units and staff have been introduced. The formalization of these processes and the social 
construction of standardized information systems are a major avenue for depersonalized 
control, exercised without explicit decision-making processes and their possible resulting 
conflicts. In contrast, Northwest is embedded in a national rule system that regulates the main 
features of the governance structure and decision processes. The intrusiveness of the rule 
system leaves relatively little room for discretionary implementation to the leadership. South 
displays the lowest level of formalization, but is similar to Central regarding the high discretion 
enjoyed by the leadership in setting and implementing the rules.  
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Rule application. At Central, performance systems are delegated to local implementation 
within a space of negotiation that aligns decentralized actors in a legitimate order of 
objectivity. Strategic annual and multi-annual plans are, for example, written on all levels of 
the organization due to certain standards and numerical indicators. It remains, however, 
within the realm of managerial discretion to eventually overrule or change such systems. The 
authority of the leadership to announce internal re-organization forms an important control 
instrument, as it creates an emergency state in which the rules of the game temporarily 
change. The national embeddedness of the rule system at Northwest can be illustrated by the 
national evaluation and accreditation regime under which evaluation exercises are regularly 
undertaken. Evaluations are intrusive as they may point out research areas or teaching 
programs that should be changed. Similarly, the internal distribution of the basic university 
grant follows criteria that reflect the national allocation model. The allocation is subject to 
lobbying and negotiation, but the national funding rules frame the process in a powerful way. 
Internal rules mostly define general principles and procedures at South, but are not directly 
used to control academics. For example, the university has a clear commitment to academic 
performance, but no formal measurement system has been introduced, and the decision to 
evaluate units is at the discretion of the leadership, based on strategic considerations and a 
perception of low performance. Budgeting is similarly a highly centralized and informal process 
controlled by the central management, without explicit allocation rules. 
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C) Informal processes and participatory arrangements are present in all three organizations, 
but play distinctly different roles. Again we find that these arrangements are highly formalized 
at Central and Northwest, where participation and influence are exercised in regular formal 
meetings and through “hearing” processes, whereas South is characterized by relative absence 
of formal participatory arrangements and a high degree of informal top down control. 
Involvement. At Central and Northwest, there are regular meetings between deans and 
department heads, rectors and deans, as well as central administrators with lower level 
administrators (faculty directors and/or subordinate managers), which serve as potential 
arrangements for bottom up influence as well as for top down control. 
In addition the corporatist tradition of ‘hearings’ are used at both these universities, whereby 
important policy proposals (e.g. strategic plans) are distributed to academics for comments. 
Thus at both institutions crucial processes such as strategy development and allocation of 
financial resources are top down with built in deliberative elements. At Northwest, 
participation is more extensive and less top-down oriented, as it includes elected 
representative bodies with some decision-making authority at the faculty and department 
levels, thus providing more extensive involvement across organizational layers and across 
employee groups. At South, the co-optation of academics into decision-making processes that 
are within the discretionary power of the leadership is actively used, but practiced under 
conditions of power asymmetry. Additionally, informal processes and participation are 
systematically exploited by South’s leadership to control the organization. The lack of formal 
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allocation rules and tight control over the budget by the central administration allow the 
leadership to allocate resources with discretion based on their priorities and to negotiate the 
budget with faculties in an informal setting. Finally, the leadership intervenes directly in 
certain matters, such as the definition of professorial profiles, the development of research 
strategic areas and the nomination of heads of units and faculty deans. This happens mostly 
through informal negotiations with individual professors and heads of institutes, thus 
effectively weakening the power of the (participative) faculty boards, which are formally in 
charge of these decisions. 
Functions of participatory arrangements. The formal participatory arrangements at Central and 
Northwest serve partly as avenues for bottom up influence, but their main function is to 
strengthen top down control by keeping managers informed about the priorities and 
expectations of their superiors, and developing support through participation and potential 
influence. 
At Central, the participation of academics as an avenue for bottom up influence has largely a 
symbolic function, whereas it is potentially somewhat more substantial at Northwest. South’s 
leadership systematically exploits informal processes and participation in order to control the 
organization. These differences notwithstanding, leadership control is the overarching function 
of participatory arrangements in all three universities. 
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Environmental influences and control 
Our case studies provide evidence of how variations in control are associated with 
environmental characteristics and highlight the interplay between various processes (see table 
4). 
Table 4 about here 
Comparing Central (high pressures), Northwest (medium pressures) and South (low pressures) 
confirms that the strength of N M policy pressures are associated with the introduction of 
formal hierarchy and rule systems (S eber et. al 2014); yet, this does not translate into similar 
variations in the extent of central control. Moreover, how NPM policies are instrumented very 
much affects their influence on control. 
Formalization of policy environment. Both Central and Northwest are confronted by an 
increasingly formalized policy environment, where rules for evaluation and performance 
assessment have been introduced. However, Central is exposed to a national rule system that 
is less intrusive, and therefore, the leadership can leverage its legitimacy in order to control 
academics indirectly. Discretion in implementation and the possibility of suspending rules are 
crucial, as this allows the leadership to clarify that rules embody central power. Northwest also 
enjoys increased managerial discretion in a number of areas, but within a national rule system 
that sets clearly defined and mandatory rules. Lack of discretion implies that national 
regulation circumscribes leadership authority and can hardly be used as internal instruments 
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of control. At the other extreme, South’s leadership enjoys the greatest discretion in setting 
rules; rules are adopted parsimoniously, but those in place are strong instruments overtly 
displaying leadership power. 
Leadership control over external resources. The reverse side of formalization is that 
standardized national funding procedures and the role of academics in funding and evaluation 
limit leadership control ver resources. In this respect, Central and Northwest present a sharp 
contrast to South. 
Governmental core funding to Central is based on national formulas that are open to some 
negotiation between the government and the university association, but the university has 
little opportunity for influence. Internal budgetary decisions come under rule systems that 
limit discretion and cannot be overturned without major internal conflict. The de-personalized 
leadership style and a mode of control emphasizing a formal hierarchy and rule setting do not 
only reflect the absence of a strong personal leadership, but also the limitation to central 
control of external resource flows. The situation is more nuanced at Northwest since a part of 
the core budget is historical, while funding rules permit a limited measure of negotiation, e.g. 
about the maximum number of funded students that may be admitted and specific grants for 
new building projects. Academic representatives influence the allocation of the government 
grant, since the national disciplinary councils on which Northwest is represented determine 
the criteria for rewarding research performance. Thus, the leadership is faced by internal 
groups who have considerable negotiating power, which sometimes creates tension and favors 
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the corporatist structure, where leadership and academics develop shared strategies for 
resourcing. In contrast, the South’s core budget is negotiated between the State and the 
leadership, while the influence of academics is almost non-existent. Tight control over the 
budget allows the leadership to forge alliances with academics in domains of strategic 
importance for the university, based on the mobilization of complementary resources at the 
policy and academic level. 
In all three universities, competitive funding decisions made by government and funding 
bodies weaken the internal position of the leadership and strengthen the power base of 
successful professionals. Influencing agenda setting in national research funding cannot be 
done by the university leadership alone, but calls for mobilizing academic members of the 
university, who are represented on the funding panels. Academics holding large external 
grants are also in a favorable negotiating position, where they can circumvent department and 
faculty leaders, enjoy direct access to university leaders, and request university budgets to 
match external funds. 
External social relationships. While the leadership in all three cases invests in external social 
relationships in order to acquire resources and control the environment, environmental 
characteristics create widely different balances in this respect between leadership and 
academics, and therefore have implications for internal control. 
Central is set in a highly formalized environment, while lacking – as a rather young and 
peripheral university – a historically established national network, its leadership does not 
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enjoy privileged access to national policy arenas. Social relationships are mostly relevant to 
important stakeholders, which might support the university, including strong informal ties with 
the region. University board members (mostly non-academic stakeholders) also link the 
university in some fields of organizational interests such as national and European politics, 
business, and R&D. As representatives of one of three major national research universities, 
Northwest leaders enjoy privileged access to ministry officials and to a more modest extent to 
members of parliament. The leadership also promotes policy initiatives through the national 
association of higher education institutions or together with the other major research 
universities when the association is unable to agree on common policies. The four external 
representatives on the university board also represent an expression of the corporatist idea of 
bringing together a representative mix of external stakeholders (academics, politicians, public 
sector, business) and the resources they might represent. In contrast South is characterized by 
a deep asymmetry between a tightly knit web of social relationships connecting the leadership 
with its environment and a faculty largely composed of foreigners who arrived recently in the 
country and are relatively less networked. Important informal ties are related to the small 
world character of the system, where leading people move between the organizational and 
the policy layer. For instance, a former university secretary general was nominated deputy 
minister for higher education and research, whereas both the current and former university 
president occupied previously leading positions at the research council. The policy style of the 
country also translates into a practice of systematic consultation between the public 
administration and the university central administration. External members of the university 
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board have also been strategically chosen among influential academics at the national level in 
order to strengthen the ties of a young university with the rest of the system. These ties also 
allow the leadership to play a significant role in acquiring external resources and in developing 
strategic alliances with other universities, a key necessity for a small and peripheral university. 
For instance, large university cooperation projects are decided by the rector’s conference, 
while regular formal and informal contacts with the research council are meant to make the 
latter aware of the university’s strategic priorities. Therefore, the establishment of research 
priority domains, which mobilize large amounts of external funds and are largely based on the 
cooperation between academics and leadership, strengthens the strategic role of the latter 
and limits the loose coupling effect of third-party funding. 
Discussion 
Our results confirm previous findings concerning the complex nature of control in knowledge-
intensive professional organizations, while pointing at the crucial role of environmental 
contingencies in shaping intra-organizational control. 
Recombining the hierarchical-bureaucratic and the professional model 
When looking at patterns of control, our analysis advances beyond previous research in two 
respects: first, understanding more precisely the role of the professional model for patterns of 
organizational control, and second, mapping the space of possibilities of control regimes in 
knowledge-intensive professional organizations. 
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We found ample evidence for the presence of formal hierarchy and rule systems in 
organizations, like universities, which were traditionally considered as loosely coupled (Clegg 
2012, Diefenbach and Sillince 2011). Rather than speaking of a hierarchical-bureaucratic model 
of coordination, it is more appropriate to consider formal hierarchy and rule systems as tools 
that can be enacted in different ways depending on local conditions (Lundholm, Rennstam and 
Alvesson 2012; Townley 2002). 
As expected, the presence of a professional model influences control. However, we found no 
support for the argument, often implicitly assumed in studies of control in such organizations 
(Musselin 2007), that the professional model and characteristics of technology determine how 
control is achieved. Our results suggest that they constrain control patterns, implying that 
some ways of controlling professionals are illegitimate: Overt use of command and control 
justified solely by hierarchical position is rare; formal hierarchy does not constitute a social 
order where organizational leaders are ascribed knowledge superior to their subordinates; 
rules can, for example, define how performance should be measured, but do not define how 
specific tasks should be performed. 
Finally, even in the most centralized settings, some degree of participation and co-decision are 
maintained. Leaders might be able to steer professionals and enforce acceptance of their 
decisions through personal power or impersonal control, but in principle, these decisions 
should find some acceptance by professionals. We hypothesize that this translates into a 
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notable fragility of leadership power where professional resistance always represents a serious 
threat to central control. 
Within these bounds, our case studies represent different ways of achieving central control 
and of leveraging hierarchy and rule systems to this end. Tentatively, we can represent the 
space of configurations by contrasting two axes, i.e. the level of formalization of social 
relationships and the centralization of power within the leadership (figure 1). 
Figure 1 about here 
Central corresponds to the soft bureaucracy, where central control is achieved in an 
impersonal way through the systematic enforcement of performance measurement 
(Courpasson 2000). In addition, discretion in designing rule systems, and the possibility of 
suspending them to restructure the organization allows the leadership to uncover from time to 
time the power that is behind rule systems (Covaleski 1988). Even if rarely mobilized directly, 
hierarchy and centralization of power represent an essential prerequisite of control through 
rule systems. 
South took a rather different path, achieving centralization through personalized informal 
power. The presence of a clear hierarchical structure and the control of resources and 
information generate asymmetry in social relationships, which therefore, allows the leadership 
to leverage them as instruments of central control. Formalization is kept to a minimum, while 
the leadership enjoys wide discretion within a broad regulatory framework. 
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Northwest can be characterized as a model, where governance is shared between leadership 
and academics. State regulation circumscribes leadership authority and the role of 
participatory arrangements, introducing some level of centralization and asymmetry between 
leaders and professionals. Finally, relatively weak formalization of central control and 
extensive participatory arrangements represent features of the traditionally loosely coupled 
system. 
In our interpretation, universities are confronted by two models for how they should be 
managed (Townley 1997; Greenwood and Hinings 1993), namely a hierarchical-bureaucratic 
model and a professional model. They provide a set of templates and of resources, which can 
be recombined to establish central control and to acquire legitimacy from the State and 
professionals. Our results demonstrate how these models structure the space of 
configurations for organizational control along the two axes of centralization of power and 
formalization of social relationships. 
Conceptualizing environmental influence 
Our findings show that environmental characteristics influence how control is achieved, 
highlighting the role of three processes, compliance with institutional pressures (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983), control of external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), as well as the 
mediating function of external social relationships (Burt 1992; Kogut 2012). 
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They advance our understanding in three respects: first, they provide evidence that the 
environment influences characteristics of the control regimes introduced in the previous 
section; second they allow a fine-grained analysis of how the interaction between the three 
processes influences control. Third, they point at the central role of the State in instrumenting 
global institutional pressures, particularly for public-sector organizations (Bozeman 2013). 
Figure 2 about here 
We conceptualize the environment as providing sources of legitimacy as well as sources of 
power influencing the characteristics of control regimes (figure 2). Control regimes need to 
achieve a sufficient level of legitimacy from the key audiences involved in university 
governance, i.e. the State and professionals. They also need to be supported by leadership 
power, since opposition from professionals is always a serious threat to central control. Power 
does not necessarily need to be overt, but has to be available, for example in crisis situations. 
Our analysis demonstrates how variations in control regimes are associated with 
environmental characteristics and their interplay providing differential sources of legitimacy 
and power. 
At Central, the leadership leverages the legitimacy of the hierarchical-bureaucratic model 
enforced by coercive pressures from the State to establish hierarchy and rule systems. At the 
same time, the formalization of resource allocation and of the relationships with the State 
strongly limits its control of external resources. Therefore, central control could be threatened 
by influential academics leveraging their external relationships to acquire power within the 
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organization. Tightening de-personalized central control, where formal rules apply 
independently of individual power, while rituals of participation are maintained, is a 
reasonable strategy to manage this risk, since it makes defiance based on personal power 
illegitimate. 
South represents the opposite case. Normative pressures towards the hierarchical-
bureaucratic model are weak, and coercive interventions from the State are almost absent. At 
the same time, the leadership holds strong control over external resources thanks to its social 
relationships. The main threat to central control could come from the academics considering 
the hierarchical-bureaucratic model as illegitimate and requesting more participation. Directly 
leveraging personal power within a formal hierarchical structure rarely mobilized directly for 
control, is therefore an effective way of organizational control. 
Northwest represents a more subtle case of balancing between legitimacy and power. The 
hierarchical-bureaucratic model is strongly legitimized within the national policy environment, 
but its implementation is somewhat ambiguous since state regulation is intrusive, and 
therefore, bears the risk of transforming the leaders into executers of state power. Further, 
the legitimacy of traditional participatory arrangements are still rather strong. Unlike at 
Central, the leadership maintains some bargaining power concerning resources and a 
privileged role in their relationship with the State, but unlike at South, this applies to 
academics as well. In this setting, legitimacy contestation by professionals is smoothed 
through their involvement in the decision-making process. At the same time, the leadership 
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can, while sharing governance, leverage on the legitimacy of the hierarchical-bureaucratic 
model and on its control of external resources in order to keep central control. 
With this analysis, we do not suggest that control regimes are determined by environmental 
characteristics; to the contrary, the availability of a space of control configurations and the 
interplay between environmental processes suggests that there is latitude for local solutions, 
also associated with intra-organizational dynamics and organizational characteristics. We show 
that environmental characteristics do matter for the selection of control models and we 
identify the different processes at work. 
Our analysis also reveals that the diffusion of an organizational template – the hierarchical-
bureaucratic model legitimizing central control and stronger leadership – does not necessarily 
lead to convergence. Its interpretation and instrumentation in the different politico-
administrative systems (Bleiklie et al. 2011, Paradeise et al. 2009) translates into national 
variations influencing organizational structure and behavior in differential ways. 
First, national policies provide instantiations of concepts like hierarchy, rule systems and 
leadership, which turn out to be filled with different meanings in each of the three countries. 
Second, they shape control through regulatory interventions, for example deciding how 
leadership is recruited, attributing power to hierarchical levels, and defining rules for 
evaluating performance. Third, they shape the structure of the resource environment in 
different ways that enable or limit control of external resources by the leadership and 
professionals (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Interactions between these processes are not 
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necessarily mutually re-enforcing, but may create a situation in which control is at the same 
time enabled as well as restricted. Our three case studies exemplify the complexity of these 
interactions. 
Conclusion: Organizational control in penetrated hierarchies 
Organizational theory has widely recognized that the institutional and resource environment 
has a deep influence on organizational behavior, and that organizations in many fields need to 
cope with institutional complexity. This body of literature has, however, been relatively silent 
about environmental influences on organizational control. In contrast, the control literature 
tended to take an internalistic perspective focusing on intra-organizational struggles, the 
dynamics of power within organizations and related issues of control in professional 
organizations. As a consequence, institutional theory has rarely been employed to understand 
variations in intra-organizational control. 
This paper contributed to filling this gap by combining these two perspectives. We have shown 
that environmental contingencies are key to understanding variations in intra-organizational 
control patterns. We propose the term penetrated hierarchies to label this coupling of intra-
organizational control with the synergetic influence of different external characteristics. 
First, the organizational field is penetrated by a new institutional template for the appropriate 
form of organizational control stressing the virtues of the hierarchical-bureaucratic model. 
Institutional pressures are, however, mediated by actors on different levels of the field. In our 
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cases, public policies lead to institutional pressures of different strengths and related 
legitimacy for the hierarchical-bureaucratic model, as compared to the traditional professional 
model. The availability of different institutional templates can further be mobilized by actors 
within the organization and generates a whole space of configurations for control regimes 
along the two axes of centralization vs. participation and of formalization vs. informal social 
relationships. 
Second, selection and stability of control models are associated with power struggles between 
the leadership and professionals, which are partly contingent on their control of external 
resources. We interpreted the selection of a control model as a delicate act of balancing two 
key resources, namely legitimacy and power, subject to environmental influences through 
different mechanisms. We highlighted in this respect the deep influence of public policies, 
which constrain and shape organizational control through regulatory interventions, but also re-
shape essential parts of the resource environment for public organizations. Multiple and 
possibly contradictory signals from the environment lead to contestation and variations in the 
organizational control model, rather than a convergence towards a single model. 
Finally, the structure of the environment influences the value of social capital vested in 
relationships between members of the organization and key external audiences, which 
penetrate their own organization by influencing the legitimacy of control models and decisions 
on resource flows for the organization. Variations in brokering positions and the negotiation-
influence of organizational members, affect internal control patterns. The social relationships 
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of organizational leaders and other organization members thus do not just influence their 
individual power and career, but have broader structural effects on how organizations are 
managed. 
While our three cases represent supposedly successful solutions to this puzzle, it would be 
interesting to further investigate the structural stability of control regimes in times of 
organizational crisis, for example exogenous shocks challenging local orders or leadership 
teams trying to impose an unsustainable model. This would shed further light on the 
conditions for stability of control regimes and their coupling with the environment. 
Extending the number of cases within the same field and the same countries would allow for 
the further disentangling of the role of internal dynamics as potential sources of variation in 
the enactment of environmental conditions and their influence on organizational control. 
Exploring environments different from our cases, e.g. national settings dominated by private 
university ownership and funding, would enhance our understanding of the influence of 
environmental characteristics on organizational control. 
Finally, universities belong to a wider and increasingly important category of knowledge-based 
professional organizations (Hinings and Leblebici 2003) such as hospitals or professional 
service firms, operating as public or private organizations within highly regulated orders. The 
theoretical framework we have proposed is assumed to be relevant for public and private 
organizations (Gault et al. 2013). Considering extensions of the framework beyond public-
sector organizations and to other organizational fields would be particularly interesting, as the 
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mediating role of the State is likely to be different when influencing the balance between 
global pressures and national instantiations of institutional orders affecting the environment of 
organizational control. 
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Table 1. A characterization of our cases (2011) 
 South Central Northwest 
Founding year 1996 1961 1946 
Undergraduate 
students 
2’377 9’300 14’500 
PhD students 263 1’050 1’489 
Faculties 4 6 6 
Disciplinary profile Mostly social sciences 
and engineering. 
Applied science and technology; 
behavioral and social sciences 
Comprehensive 
Average impact of 
scientific publications* 
1.7 1.6 1.6 
* World average = 1. Source: Scimago Ranking 2011. 
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Table 2. Institutional and resource environment 
 South Central Northwest 
National policy 
regime 
Policy decisions are based on 
consensus and negotiation with the 
actors; central importance of social 
relationships. 
Policy decisions based on 
participation and negotiations, 
tradition of top-down 
enforcement of rules and norms. 
Policy decisions based on 
participation and negotiations, 
producing standardized solutions 
with local adaptations in 
implementation. 
Strength of NPM 
pressures 
Weak pressures. Some NPM 
elements introduced with a focus 
on increasing autonomy and 
reducing bureaucratic control. 
Early and strong adoption of 
NPM, co-existing with the 
traditional network governance 
model. 
Latecomer, but acceleration of 
NPM reforms after 2003. 
Timing of 
reforms 
Since the mid-1990s. Since mid-1980s. Modest reforms since the early 
1990s. Major reforms during the 
last decade. 
State 
intervention in 
internal 
governance 
State appoints the majority of 
board members and decides on the 
Faculties. Organizational structure 
decided by the university 
autonomously. 
Top down appointment of 
leaders/managers, within 
national regulations organizations 
are free to re-organize and 
profile. 
Some autonomy to re-organize but 
also strong state capability of 
intervention. Ministry appoints 
external board members. 
Role of the State 
in establishing 
rule systems 
Internal rule systems are decided 
by the university board. 
Rule system structured by 
national regulation including 
corporate governance, 
accountability, and funding 
formula. 
Rule systems structured by national 
legislation, funding system, 
evaluation schemes, and auditing 
and reporting systems. 
Evaluation Light formative quality assurance 
with no financial consequences and 
limited public visibility. 
Mandatory systems for audits, 
national research evaluation, 
teaching accreditation and 
evaluation; no direct financial 
consequences 
Evaluations regularly undertaken 
under auspices of research council 
or quality assurance agency. Results 
important for strategic choices; no 
direct financial consequences. 
Allocation of 
core funding 
Mixed model: a large share of 
negotiated budget, plus a 
component based on students and 
third-party funds. 
Formula funding based on 
standardized indicators. 
Mixed form: about 60% of core 
grant is historical, 25% based on 
teaching and 15% on research 
performance. 
Share of third-
party funding 
About one quarter of research 
funds from third-party funds. 
About one fourth of income from 
external research funding 
sources. 
About 15-25% third party funding 
external for research universities, 
mostly generated through peer-
review mechanisms. 
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Table 3. Instruments of control 
 South Central Northwest 
Hierarchy 
Central 
coordination 
and control 
Concentration of power in the 
hands of the board, of the 
rector and central 
administrator, weak power of 
faculties. Co-optation of 
faculties in the top 
hierarchical layer with a 
subordinate position. 
Top-down hierarchy with checks 
and balances. Strong role of the 
rectorate, of deans and research 
directors, and of management 
teams; weak power of faculties. 
Academic bodies abolished or have 
a consultative role. 
Increasingly top-down hierarchy with 
some remaining features of a collegial 
organization. Stronger power of 
rectors, deans, and chairs while 
representative bodies have retained 
involvement in decision processes. 
Allocating 
responsibility 
Allocation of responsibility 
mainly concerns research and 
teaching, strategy and 
financial resources are highly 
centralized. 
Clearly defined allocation of 
responsibilities concerning 
organization, strategic direction, 
and financial affairs. 
Allocation of responsibility concerning 
strategy and financial resources, 
research, teaching and human 
resources is clearly defined. 
Constructing 
management 
Managerial positions at the 
central level. At the faculty 
and institute level mostly 
academic positions. 
Members of the rectorate and 
deans are full-time managers, some 
with external managerial 
experience. 
Members of rectorate and deans are in 
practice full-time managers. 
Introduction of management teams at 
all levels. 
Rule systems 
Setting 
objectives 
Soft and informally stated 
objectives, but pressure to 
demonstrate performance. 
Systematic establishment of rules 
and standards for managing the 
organization. 
National rules and standards for setting 
goals and managing the organization. 
Measuring 
results 
No formal measurement 
scheme; peer-based approach. 
Central administration owns 
relevant information. 
Regular measurement of 
performance indicators and of the 
financial and staffing situation. 
Measuring and rewarding performance 
built into national funding system. 
Formalizing 
decision-
making 
procedures 
Some formalization, important 
role of informal contacts and 
negotiations. 
Increasing formalization partly due 
to national legislation, partly to 
internally developed regulations. 
Increasing formalization of decision-
making procedures partly in national 
legislation, partly in internally 
developed regulations. 
Informal control instruments 
Mobilizing 
institutional 
pressure 
Vision of becoming a research-
oriented university. Direct 
personnel pressure on 
academics by the leadership. 
Internal information systems / rule 
setting due to external audit / 
evaluation. Aligning the 
organization to external funding 
priorities. 
Clearly stated goal of improving 
academic quality and visibility of the 
university. Using soft pressure and 
incentives to influence academics. 
Informal Practice of informal Co-optation of leading academics in Role of informal consultation limited. 
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consultation 
and negotiation 
consultations to prepare 
decisions; leadership and 
board tend to arbitrate. 
policy-design and informal decision-
making. Staff briefings. 
Widespread consulting through formal 
hearing processes. 
Delegation to 
peer 
coordination, 
co-construction 
of rule systems 
Discretionary practice by 
university leadership to create 
informal working groups to 
prepare new rules. 
Top-down assignment of temporary 
working groups for policy 
development. 
Delegation of implementation. 
Local adaptation of central rule 
systems. 
Delegation of policy implementation. 
Local adaptation of central (often 
national) rule systems. 
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Table 4. External leadership relationships and resource control 
 South Central Northwest 
Social relationships 
of the leadership 
Membership in rector’s 
conference. 
Strong personal ties of the 
rector to the research council 
and to the deputy ministry of 
research. Close informal ties 
to the regional government. 
Rectorate represents university in 
association of universities, 
federation of technical universities, 
and innovation policy body. 
Strong informal ties within the 
region, to intermediary policy and 
funding bodies. 
Rector plays an important role in the 
association of universities, 
particularly in the sub group of the 
three major research universities. 
Strong informal ties to senior 
ministry officials and research 
council, efforts to establish stronger 
regional ties. 
Control of core 
funding 
The leadership has a strong 
discretionary role in 
negotiating directly with the 
regional government the core 
budget. 
Limited role in field-wide 
negotiations of largely 
standardized core budgets based 
on funding formula. 
Limited role in negotiating the core 
budget. Lobbying for dedicated 
grants to major building projects. 
Control of third-
party funds 
Leadership influences 
decision on national strategic 
projects of relevance to the 
university. Close cooperation 
between academics 
appointed at the research 
council and the leadership, 
which has regular contacts 
with the research council. 
Role in regional funding and 
development initiatives. Limited 
role in negotiating state funding 
and third party funding. 
Academics with links to funding 
bodies operate independently of 
the leadership, but may cooperate 
on issues of strategic importance. 
Leadership has little direct influence 
third party funding 
Academics represented on research 
council boards operate 
independently of the leadership, but 
may cooperate on issues of strategic 
importance.  
Control of external 
evaluation 
Formative evaluation by the 
national accreditation agency 
managed together with the 
leadership, which has strong 
control on it and discretion on 
how to implement 
recommendations.  
Regular national evaluations of 
teaching and research partly 
managed with the leadership. Full 
leadership discretion on how to 
implement recommendations. 
Evaluation of disciplinary 
departments undertaken by 
research council. Quality assurance 
system evaluated by national 
accreditation agency. 
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Figure 1. Space of configurations of control 
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Figure 2. Coupling between environment and control 
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